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ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTATION PROCESSES IN STRATEGIC 
INTERACTION PROBLEMS 
Francesca Martignone*, Cristina Sabena** 
*University of Eastern Piedmont; **University of Turin  
In this study we use Habermas construct to analyse argumentation processes related 
to strategic interaction problems, i.e. problems in which a player tries to figure out 
what the other player(s) will do, and to choose the best strategy between the possible 
ones. These problems provide suitable environments to develop and analyse students’ 
planning and control processes, of a paramount importance in mathematical 
problem-solving. We will integrate Habermas construct with specific theoretical tools 
to frame students’ processes with respect to planning and control, and we will analyse 
excerpts from a classroom discussion in grade 4, in order to highlight specific 
features of the argumentative discourses, brought to the fore in strategic games.  
Strategic interaction problems  
In strategic interaction problems, two or more decision makers can control one or 
more variables that affect the problem results. Each individual's situation is fully 
dependent on the move of the opponents, and the players know this fact. The 
decisions of each player influence the final result of the game: so every player should 
think, not only about his/her possible moves, but also about what other players should 
do if they want to construct a successful strategy. Game Theory offers suitable 
mathematical models for the winning strategies, based on specific assumptions about 
how ideal, hypercalculating, emotionless players would behave (Von Neumann & 
Morgestern, 1947). However, analyzing strategic interaction games as 
problem-solving activities, Simon (1955) argues that the limited capabilities of the 
human mind (memory system and the development of calculus, attention span, etc.) 
combined with the complexity of the external environment, make often impossible 
the elaboration of the strategic choices predicted by Game Theory. The difficulties 
concerning planning ahead are well documented and studied in Behavioral Game 
Theory research, which links Game Theory to cognitive science by adding cognitive 
details. As concerns limits on iterated thinking, the data collected by Camerer (2003) 
show that, during the resolution of strategic interaction problems faced for the first 
time, only few subjects are able to develop many thinking ahead steps (limited 
strategic thinking). 
Planning and control in mathematical problem solving  
Our research is based on the assumption that strategic interaction problems constitute 
suitable environments to develop and analyse both planning processes (e.g. to figure 
out winning strategies for the game), and control processes (e.g. choosing suitable 
semiotic resources to represent the possible outcomes of a certain move), which are 
important features of genuine problem-solving. In a problem solving activity, the 
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imagination and planning processes are related to the possible actions to be 
performed across time. For this reason, the studies about mind times (Guala and 
Boero, 1999; Tulving, 2002; Atance & O’Neil, 2001) can be useful to interpret 
specific cognitive processes involved therein. Guala and Boero (1999) identify some 
examples of mind times (i.e. time of past experience, contemporaneity times, 
exploration time, synchronous connection time) involved in the imagination of 
possible actions over time. In particular, they analyse the exploration time pointing 
out the projections that can be developed from the present onward (e.g. “which 
strategies can I develop to find the solution?”, “How can I manipulate the data to 
solve the problem?”) or from the future back to the past (e.g. “I think up a solution 
and explore it in order to find the operations to be performed, depending on available 
resources”). The study of the planning processes can be analysed deeper taking into 
account the cognitive studies about the human ability to remember and imagine fact 
and situations in the course of time (Martignone, 2007). In particular, considering the 
mind construction of possible future events, we can distinguish between the 
knowledge that we possess about an event (semantic future thinking), versus thought 
which involves projecting the self into the future (episodic future thinking) to 
“experience” an event (Atance & O’Neill, 2001). ‘‘Remembering’’ and ‘‘projecting’’ 
need the ability to conceive the self in the past and future, which goes beyond simple 
“knowing” about past events and future facts. Knowledge can support and structure 
the imagination processes by means of the identification of frames or scripts that 
influence subject’s expectations on stereotyped situations.  
Note that in episodic future thinking the imagination is not given free reign, but rather, 
the projection is constrained. For instance, envisaging my forthcoming vacation might 
require me to consider such factors as how much spending money I will have, how much 
work I will have completed before I go, and so on. (ibid., p.533) 
Besides planning processes, also control processes play a fundamental role in 
problem-solving activities. As introduced by Schoenfeld (1985), control deals with 
“global decisions regarding the selection and implementation of resources and 
strategies” (p. 15). It entails actions such as: planning, monitoring, assessment, 
decision-making, and conscious meta-cognitive acts. In the context of argumentation 
and proof activities, Arzarello & Sabena (2011) show how students’ processes are 
managed and guided according to intertwined modalities of control, namely semiotic 
and theoretic control. Semiotic control relates to knowledge and decisions concerning 
mainly the selection and implementation of semiotic resources. For instance, semiotic 
control is necessary to choose a suitable semiotic representation for a problem (e.g. 
an algebraic formula vs a Cartesian graph). Theoretic control requires the explicit 
reference to a theoretical aspects of the mathematical activity: it intervenes when a 
subject use consciously a certain property or theorem for supporting an argument.   
Methodology 
Methodology is based on teaching-experiments, planned and analyzed with the 
collaboration of classroom teachers. Activities develop around classical strategy 
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games, such as NIM, Chomp, Prisoner Dilemma, etc., and alternate game phases with 
reflection phases (collective discussions, written reports). Video-recordings of the 
discussions and students’ written reports are collected and analysed on a qualitative 
and interpretative base.  
In the following we consider a case-study in grade 4, based on a strategic interaction 
game called “Race to 20”, used by Brousseau to illustrate the Theory of Didactical 
Situation (Brousseau, 1997). The rules of the game are the following. There are two 
players: they know the possible alternative choices and the relative outcomes, they 
don not cooperate and they do not know in advance the adversary strategies. The first 
player must say a number between 1 and 2. The second player must add 1 or 2 to the 
previous number, and says the result. Now the first player adds 1 or 2, and so on… 
The player who says 20 wins the game. 
Analysis of the collective discussion  
We analyse some excerpts of the collective discussion organized by the teacher after 
the children have played the game several times, at first individually, and then in 
teams. In the discussion, students are asked i) to describe possible winning strategies 
and ii) to justify them. In particular, the attention (both on didactical and research 
planes) is on the development of argumentation processes: we analyse them as 
rational discourses in Habermas model. Numbers 14 and 17 are soon identified as 
“winning numbers”. Justifications are based on the possible moves of the two 
players. We report Elena’s contribution:  
Elena: it’s necessary to arrive before at 14 and then at 17. Because if you do from 14 
you do plus 1 and arrive at 15 and then you do plus 2 and arrive at 17, which 
then…you do plus 1 and arrive at 18 and the other does plus 2 and arrives at 
20. Rather, if you do plus 2 from 14, you arrive at 16 and the other does 1 and 
arrives at 17, the other if he does plus 2 arrives at 19, you do plus 1 and arrive 
at 20. Hence anyway from 14 to 17 you arrive anyway at 20. 
Elena carries out her argumentation by describing the possible moves of the players 
(episodic future thinking) who start from two particular positions (14 and 17). The 
teleological aspect is clear: she wants describe the winning choices. Because the 
steps of thinking are limited (limited strategic thinking), she manages to plan ahead 
only close to the winning end. When teacher asks students if there are other number 
like 14 and 17, different scenarios are explored by students. The number line helps 
them to control the winning positions and strategies, relying on the semiotic 
representation at the blackboard (Fig. Y).  
 
Figure Y. The written representation used to play the game. 
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The students’ attention is focused both on backwards movements, in search of 
previous winning position, and on the forward movements, to check the efficacy of 
the strategies.  
Diego: 11 maybe is an important number, because maybe my team adds 2 and it is 13, 
the other team adds 1 and arrives at 14, I add 1, 15, they add 2 and it is 17 
Elisa: but if they are stupid they make plus 1 and arrive at 18, we make plus 2 and arrive 
at 20; but they are not so stupid to do plus 1, eh! 
Also Diego and Elisa rely on the episodic future thinking to imagine the possible 
moves of the players and justify their hypothesis about number 11. The steps of 
thinking ahead are always “close” to the new winning numbers (limited strategic 
thinking). In the rational discourse of Elisa, the teleological component is linked to 
the goal of the game, getting to number 20, and it is guided by her knowledge 
(stressed in the discourse) that the other players have the same information and 
capacity. After that many students have expressed similar arguments, a general rule, 
which can drive all strategies, emerges: 
Giulio: I think that for the winning numbers you always remove 3: from 20 you remove 
3 and you arrive at 17; from 17 you remove 3 and you arrive at 14, I think that 
another winning number could be 11, could be…8, could be…5, could be…2 
Teacher: Explain well this idea 
Giulio: Because…that is I don’t know, if I arrive at 2…I don’t know, I begin, I make 1, 
no I make 2, he arrives and makes 1 (gesture in Fig. Xa), I put 2 and I arrived 
at 5 (Fig. Xb), which I think is a winning number… yes, arrived at 5…it is a 
winning number, I think. Then…he adds 2, say (Fig. Xc), I  add 1 and I 
arrived at 8, which is another winning number. He adds 1, I add 2 and I arrive 
at…12, which is another winning number. He adds 2, I add 1, and I arrived at 
14, which is another winning number, he adds 1 I add 2, we arrive at 17 which 
is a winning number, he adds 1 or 2, I add 1 o 2 and I win 
 
Figure Xa,b,c. Giulio’s gestures in his argument. 
Giulio at first states a general rule to find out all the winning numbers, beyond those 
already found. His sentence expresses the rule in a general way, as an a-temporalized 
relationship between numbers (“you always remove 3” from 20). Giulio’s argument 
is based on the backward induction (similar to what described in Game Theory): he 
starts from the winning result and moving backward he identifies the best strategy to 
win the game. In the argumentative discourse on the winning strategy, the 
teleological and epistemic components of rationality are on the foreground. The 
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epistemic plane relies on the relationships between numbers, and in particular on the 
control over the number line model, recalled in the written schema introduced by the 
teacher to play the game (Fig. Y). This representation has now become a thinking 
tool for Giulio, who shows to have a semiotic control over it. Asked to better explain 
his ideas (communicative component), the boy imagines a match, and describes the 
moves in a temporalized way (episodic future thinking). The subtraction turns into an 
onward movement starting from the very first move (the number 2). This movement 
is produced by means of a rhythmical repetition of the same linguistic structure: “he 
adds…I add… and I arrive at…, which is a winning number”. Linguistic repetition is 
co-timed with a gesture repetition during the entire argument: gestures are 
synchronous with the added and numbers in the imagined game. Gestures and words 
together constitute a schema through which the generality of the argument is 
conveyed. Gesture in Fig. Xa (open hand as holding something) is co-timed with the 
words “makes 1”: its metaphorical nature indicates that while saying “1”, Giulio is 
indeed meaning “let’s say 1” or “any move of the player”, something similar to what 
Balacheff in proving processes called “generic example” (Balacheff, 1987). This 
interpretation is confirmed, besides by the voice intonation, by the gesture-speech 
combination of Fig. Xc: a similar gesture is performed within a similar speech 
schema, but now the generic nature of the example is made explicit by the word 
“say”. 
Concluding remarks 
In this paper we analysed some excerpts of a discussion about the winning strategies 
in a particular strategic interaction problem: the Race to 20. It provided a suitable 
context to study the students’ argumentations, intended as rational discourses in the 
Habermas construct. The analysis integrated Habermas construct with cognitive 
studies about mind times, and semiotic aspects of control processes. As a result of the 
use of the different interpretative tools, an important distinction in the teleological 
component of the argumentations emerged. In fact, we can identify two teleological 
planes: a pragmatic plane, related to the goal of the game (“Which strategy can I 
choose or develop in order to win the game?”), and a theoretical plane, related to 
justifying the chosen strategy (“How can I justify that my strategy is the best one?”). 
On the theoretical plane, the teleological dimension strongly intertwines with the 
communicative one, when students are asked to explain and justify their strategies to 
their mates. Furthermore, as we could see in the reported excerpts, the two planes are 
deeply intertwined: theoretical considerations can fruitful ground on pragmatic ones, 
and—more important—can also be justified on a pragmatic base (see Giulio’s 
argument). This feature is inherent to strategic interaction problems, what makes 
them suitable activities to develop complex argumentation activities from early 
school grades. We plan to validate the scope of these results on a more extended 
empirical base. 
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